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EFFECTS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5000.02 
ON JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE – CHEMICAL 






This project provides an analysis on the expected effects of DoDI 5000.02, the 
most recent guidance that seeks to reform DOD acquisition. Specifically, it researches 
and analyzes the effects of other acquisition reform items on the JPEO-CBD portfolio, 
and the expected trend of the newest guidance toward achieving greater effectiveness in 
acquisition. Methodology includes a comparative analysis of items that may indicate 
effectiveness, such as project schedules and number of documents required. 
Data and analysis indicate that DoDI 5000.02 may not have increased acquisition 
efficiency throughout the military services. Additional data collection specific to smaller 
acquisition programs, as well as targeting study of leading rather than lagging indicators, 
may provide greater insight into the effects of recent acquisition reforms. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES.........................................................................2 
C. PROJECT ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................2 
1. Problem Identification ...................................................................2 
2. Informed Foundation.....................................................................3 
3. Data .................................................................................................3 
4. Analysis ...........................................................................................3 
D. PROJECT BENEFIT ................................................................................3 
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH .......................................................4 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................5 
A. RECENT REFORM EFFORTS ...............................................................5 
1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act .....................6 
2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act ..........................................6 
3. Federal Acquisition Reform Act ...................................................6 
4. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 ................................7 
5. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act ...................................7 
6. Better Buying Power 1.0 ................................................................8 
7. Better Buying Power 2.0 ................................................................8 
8. Better Buying Power 3.0 ................................................................8 
9. DOD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02..................................................9 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORTS .............10 
1. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2013 
Annual Report ..............................................................................10 
2. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 
Annual Report ..............................................................................10 
3. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2015 
Annual Report ..............................................................................10 
4. Data Interpretation of the Annual Reports ...............................11 
5. Scope of the Annual Reports as it Relates to JPEO-CBD ........11 
C. CBDP ENTERPRISE STRUCTURE ....................................................11 
D. JPEO-CBD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ...............................12 
III. ACQUISITION REFORM DATA AND ANALYSIS ......................................15 
A. PRE-BBP 1.0 ............................................................................................15 
 viii 
1. Contract Total Cost Growth Trends: Development Phase 
Data ...............................................................................................15 
2. Contract Cost Growth Trends: Development Phase 
Analysis .........................................................................................16 
B. BETWEEN BBP 1.0 AND BBP 2.0 ........................................................16 
1. Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses 
(PARCA) Data ..............................................................................16 
2. PARCA Analysis ..........................................................................18 
C. POST-2015 DODI 5000.02 ......................................................................19 
1. JPEO-CBD Program Schedules .................................................19 
2. Program Schedule Analysis ........................................................21 
3. Documentation Requirements Data ...........................................22 
4. Documentation Requirements Analysis .....................................27 
5. CBD Contractual Workload Data ..............................................27 
6. JPEO-CBD Contractual Workload Analysis ............................34 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................37 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................41 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Years (FYs) 2001–2017. ...............1 
Figure 2. Evolution of Recent Acquisition Reform ....................................................5 
Figure 3. CBDP Enterprise Organization ..................................................................12 
Figure 4. JPEO-CBD Organizational Structure through February 2016...................13 
Figure 5. JPEO-CBD Organizational Structure after March 2016 ............................14 
Figure 6. DOD Total Cost Growth: Development Contracts (1992–2011). 
Source: OUSD AT&L (2013, p. 43). .........................................................15 
Figure 7. Program Cost-Related Performance: Nunn-McCurdy Breaches 
(2007–2014). Source:  OUSD AT&L. (2015, p. xxii). ..............................18 
Figure 8. ACC-APG Organizational Structure Supporting JPEO-CBD ...................28 
Figure 9. ACC-APG and JPEO-CBD Contract Actions, FY12-FY15 ......................29 
Figure 10. ACC-APG and JPEO-CBD Funding Obligations, FY12-FY15 ................29 
Figure 11. ACC-Belvoir Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for JPEO-
CBD, FY12-FY15 ......................................................................................30 
Figure 12. ACC-Edgewood Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for 
JPEO-CBD, FY12-FY15 ...........................................................................31 
Figure 13. ACC-Natick Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for JPEO-
CBD, FY12-FY15 ......................................................................................32 
Figure 14. ACC-APG Tenant Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for 
JPEO-CBD, FY12-FY15 ...........................................................................33 
Figure 15. ACC-Combined Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for 
JPEO-CBD, FY12-FY15 ...........................................................................34 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. PARCA Root Causes Analyses (Statutory and Discretionary; 2010–
2012) Source: OUSD AT&L (2013, p. 34)................................................17 
Table 2. BSCAV-P Schedule ...................................................................................19 
Table 3. NGDS Schedule .........................................................................................20 
Table 4. Next Generation Chemical Detector Schedule ..........................................20 
Table 5. Joint Biological Tactical Detection System Schedule ...............................21 
Table 6. Selected Document Comparison, DoDI 5000.02 (2008) vs. DoDI 
5000.02 (2015) ...........................................................................................23 
Table 7. ACC-APG and JPEO-CBD Contract Actions and Funding 
Obligations, FY12-FY15 ...........................................................................28 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACAT  Acquisition Category 
ACC  Army Contracting Command 
ADM  Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AoA  Analysis of Alternatives 
APG  Aberdeen Proving Ground 
BBP  Better Buying Power 
BSCAV-P  Bioscavenger - Plasma 
CBD  Chemical and Biological Defense 
CDD  Capability Development Document 
DAMIR  Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
DASD  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
DAWIA  Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DoDI  Department of Defense Instruction 
EO  Executive Order 
FARA  Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
FASA  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
FY  Fiscal Year  
IPR  In-Process Review 
IT&NSS  Information Technology and National Security Systems 
IUID  Item Unique Identification 
JBTDS  Joint Biological Tactical Detection System 
JPEO-CBD  Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 
Biological Defense 
JPM  Joint Project Manager 
LCMP  Life Cycle Management Plan 
LFT&E  Live Fire Test & Evaluation 
LRIP  Low Rate Initial Production 
MAIS  Major Automated Information Systems 
MDA  Milestone Decision Authority 
 xiv 
MDAP  Major Defense Acquisition Program 
MDD  Milestone Development Decision 
MS  Milestone 
NDIA  National Defense Industrial Association 
NEPA  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
NGCD  Next Generation Chemical Detector 
NGCD  Next Generation Chemical Detector 
NGDS  Next Generation Diagnostic System 
OMS/MP  Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile 
OPETS  Omnibus Program, Engineering and Technical Support 
OT&E  Operational Test & Evaluation 
OTA  Operational Test Agency 
PARCA  Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis 
PESHE  Programmatic Environmental, Safety, and Health 
Evaluation 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
SBIR  Small Business Innovation Research 
SEP  Systems Engineering Plan 
STAR  System Threat Assessment Report 
STTR  Small Business Technology Transfer Program 
TEMP  Test & Evaluation Master Plan 
TOA  Total Obligation Authority 
USD (AT&L)  [Office of the] Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics 




While the United States achieves its national security missions by 
equipping its military forces with the best weapons systems in the world, 
questions continue about the performance of the defense acquisition 
system. How effective is it? How can that effectiveness be objectively 
measured? Can we use those measures to affect behaviors with appropriate 
incentives or determine which policies and procedures improve results and 
which turn out to be misguided?  
Answering these questions requires more than opinion. It requires analysis 
of unbiased data to discover insights into underlying effects. These, in 
turn, will inform better policy and programmatic decisions. 
—Hon. Frank Kendall (2013) 
A. BACKGROUND  
Many efforts have been made over the past twenty-five (25) years to increase the 
effectiveness of acquisition of goods and services within the Department of  
Defense (DOD). Funding requirements are increasing, yet program resources seem harder 
to find. Capability gaps remain unaddressed, yet the DOD base budget has generally 
shown continued growth through 2013, as shown in Figure 1 (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 2014, 2015).   
 
Note: Funding is shown in Current Year dollars; FY17 is planned. 






















































As current capabilities age out of the field, the DOD workforce must become 
adept at doing “more without more” (Carter, 2011, p. 1). To drive towards this balance, 
attempts to reform the acquisition system have continued. 
One of the most recent of these acquisition reform efforts is the recent update to 
DOD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, released in January 2015. The DoDI 5000.02 update is 
intended to enhance discussion and thoughtfulness regarding acquisition program 
planning and management, and to encompass the acquisition reform efforts initiated since 
the 2008 version of the DoDI 5000.02.  
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to determine, based on an analysis of 
historical trends, what the expected effect of the January 2015 DoDI 5000.02 will be on 
acquisition effectiveness of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 
Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) portfolio. Effectiveness will be measured primarily in 
terms of schedule from project inception to delivery of a capability to the warfighter, 
including possible changes with respect to number of in-process reviews and decision 
points, as well as secondary metrics including number of acquisition documents required. 
A secondary objective of this research is to determine the extent to which other 
recent acquisition reforms also generate both intended and unintended potential impacts 
on overall acquisition performance, specifically in the JPEO-CBD community. 
C. PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
1. Problem Identification 
This project will analyze, based on historical trends in acquisition reform, the 
extent to which the January 2015 issuance of DoDI 5000.02 will likely increase 
acquisition effectiveness within the JPEO-CBD community, and the extent to which it 
may place additional burdens on the JPEO-CBD to deliver capability to the warfighter. 
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2. Informed Foundation 
This project will leverage the annual Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System reports as the basis for trend analysis and discussion. The three reports that will be 
referenced are from 2013, 2014, and 2015. 
It is important to note that each of the annual reports highlights a different focus: 
• 2013: total life-cycle cost performance 
• 2014: contract incentive techniques and their effects on cost, schedule, and 
technical performance 
• 2015: analysis of broader factors that influence acquisition outcomes. 
3. Data 
In addition to the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2013 Annual 
Report, this project will use a sampling of documentation collected from various 
programs and projects within the JPEO-CBD portfolio. This data will include schedules 
depicting acquisition phase length, funding requirements, and other acquisition 
documents. This project will also demonstrate changes in contractual workload within 
two of the Chemical Biological Defense (CBD) contracting divisions. 
4. Analysis 
Analysis methodology will include a literature review of the relevant documents, 
as well as other research findings concerning the effectiveness of these various reform 
measures. Additionally, this project will include a comparative analysis of items that may 
indicate other proximate measures of effectiveness, such as project schedules and number 
of documents required. 
D. PROJECT BENEFIT 
As acquisition reform efforts have intensified, DOD is adjusting to “doing more 
without more.” The information contained in this project will help establish the 
foundation for JPEO-CBD to achieve its mission with fewer resources. It will broaden 
understanding of the present and future acquisition environments through exploration and 
analysis of the effectiveness of past and current reform measures. This project will 
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explore the current strategies and provide recommendations to ensure that JPEO-CBD is 
able to fulfill warfighter needs as effectively as possible. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This research is organized into three (3) basic sections: (1) background 
information, (2) data, and (3) analysis.   
First, background information is available to help the reader understand some of 
the most recent reform efforts. Additional background information is provided to help the 
reader understand the CBD enterprise organizational structure, with further definition of 
elements of the JPEO-CBD structure. This is important to effectively narrow the scope of 
the research to the level of the program management offices within the JPEO-CBD and 
the DoDI 5000.02’s expected effects therein. 
Following the background information, the data and analysis are grouped into 
three (3) phases: (1) Pre-Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0, (2) Between BBP 1.0 and 2.0, 
and (3) BBP 2.0 through DoDI 5000.02. These topics are organized in such a way that 
trend analyses can be performed, where appropriate, on metrics demonstrating 
effectiveness. BBP 3.0 is discussed only in the background section for completeness. 
However, data from this phase and beyond is not analyzed nor discussed separately as the 
guidance contained therein is both geared towards technical excellence rather than 
acquisition program or process efficiency and too recent to discern any noticeable effects 




In these times of extreme budget pressures and uncertainty…improving 
the performance of the defense acquisition system is essential for the 
DOD. 
—Hon. Frank Kendall (2014) 
 
A. RECENT REFORM EFFORTS 
Modern acquisition reform intensified in the 1990s with the passing of the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 1990, the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA) in 1996. These acts were intended to drive more effectiveness into the 
Department of Defense’s acquisition processes. Following the FARA, DoDI 5000.02 was 
released in 2003 and again in 2008. More recent endeavors include the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) (2009) and the BBP guidance memorandums of 2010 
and 2012. The most recent additions to guidance reform are the January 2015 version of 
DoDI 5000.02 and the third installment of BBP, released in 2015 and referred to as BBP 
3.0. The timeline of these reform efforts is shown in Figure 2, Evolution of Recent 
Acquisition Reform. 
 

























1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act  
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), established in 
1990, sought to establish consistent training and professional certification standards for 
the acquisition workforce. It emphasized the need to offer civilians greater opportunities 
for professional development and advancement (Garcia et al., 1997, p. 1). Garcia et al. 
also note that “DAWIA implementation allowed DOD Components to move forward to 
meet the daily acquisition challenges with a more highly trained and better equipped 
workforce” (p. 11).   
In addition to growing the civilian workforce in terms of professional 
development, DAWIA also reduced the size of the acquisition workforce in order to 
increase efficiency (Hunter et al., 2015, p. 6). 
2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act  
Established in 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) resulted 
from recognition that the acquisition process had become too complex. Strategically, 
FASA sought “to develop a more equitable balance between government-unique 
requirements and the need to lower the government’s cost of doing business” (Barry, 
1995, p. 3). FASA intended to decrease acquisition burden primarily through system 
procurement by implementing a performance-based approach. FASA further “reduced 
unique purchasing requirements, increased the use of simplified acquisition procedures 
for low-cost procurements through raising the simplified acquisition threshold to 
$100,000, and sought to obtain goods and services faster in order to reduce the in-house 
costs of doing business” (O’Connell, 2012, para. 4). Additionally, FASA eliminated or 
modified many obsolete and redundant laws and directed the use of commercial 
specifications instead of military standards and specifications wherever practical. 
3. Federal Acquisition Reform Act  
The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996, later renamed the Clinger-
Cohen Act, “provided [additional] guidance to ensure a fair and open competitive process 
for contractor support … and allowed contracting officers more discretion when making 
 7 
competitive range determinations. Additionally, the FARA established the Chief 
Information Officer role” (Acquisition Community Connection, 2015, para. 1). 
4. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 
The DoDI 5000.02 issued in 2003 made major changes to the acquisition 
framework that had been in place since 1971. It expanded phases and decision points, and 
added over thirty (30) additional documents to the process. DoDI 5000.02 was then 
reissued in 2008, primarily changing the early phases of the acquisition process. It placed 
additional emphasis on systems engineering, as well as integrated test and evaluation 
throughout the program (SM&A, 2009).  
The 2008 version also instituted the following changes from the 2003 version: 
• Major efforts and decision points were renamed: 
• Materiel Development Decision (MDD) replaced the Concept 
Decision, and “became required regardless of where the program 
enters the acquisition process” (GAO, 2009, p. 20) 
• Pre-Milestone (MS) A became the Materiel Solution Analysis 
phase 
• Pre-MS B phase renamed to Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development 
• Post-Critical Design Review replaced the Design Readiness 
Review 
• Requirements for analysis of materiel and non-materiel solutions changed; 
and the Milestone Decision Authority began approving the materiel 
solution at MS A or program point of entry. 
• Competitive prototyping became mandatory during the Technology 
Development phase. (2009, p. 20). 
5. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act  
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 brought about 
major reforms to the acquisition process. Additional director positions within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense were created to oversee and influence acquisition processes. 
Some of these positions include the director of cost assessment and program evaluation, 
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for developmental test & evaluation, 
DASD for systems engineering, and director of performance and root cause analysis. 
WSARA emphasized more rigor in determining requirements, including trade-off 
considerations, and influenced acquisition strategies by promoting competition 
throughout a system’s life cycle. Furthermore, Congressional reporting requirements 
increased. Hunter et al. note that “In signing the bill, President Obama said, ‘The purpose 
of this law will be to limit cost overruns before they spiral out of control. It will 
strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing officials who will be charged with 
closely monitoring the weapons systems we’re purchasing to ensure that costs are 
controlled’” (2015, p 12). 
6. Better Buying Power 1.0 
The first BBP memorandum, signed by Mr. Ashton Carter in 2010 and known as 
BBP 1.0, emphasized life-cycle affordability and controlling program cost growth. BBP 
1.0 provided specific guidance to achieve greater affordability through “[incentivizing 
productivity and innovation in industry, [promoting] real competition, [improving] 
tradecraft in acquisition services, and [reducing] non-productive processes and 
bureaucracy” (Carter, 2011, p. 6). 
7. Better Buying Power 2.0 
The follow-on BBP memorandum, signed by Mr. Frank Kendall in 2012 and 
known as BBP 2.0, again focused on life-cycle affordability. Containing stronger 
language than BBP 1.0, BBP 2.0 increased emphasis on elimination of unproductive 
processes and bureaucracy. Additionally, BBP 2.0 added guidance to “improve the 
professionalism of the total acquisition workforce” (Kendall, 2012, p. 7). 
8. Better Buying Power 3.0 
The third installment in the Better Buying Power series, known as BBP 3.0 and 
issued in 2015, emphasizes technical excellence and innovation. Initiatives contained in 
BBP 3.0 continue to drive towards affordability, savings opportunities, and effective 
incentives. It provides new focus areas in “technical excellence, innovation, and 
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dominant military capabilities” (Kendall, 2015, p. 2). According to Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Bob Work and Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics Frank Kendall III, “whereas BBP 1.0 and 2.0 focused on reforming [the] 
acquisition processes and making them more efficient, BBP 3.0 is primarily about 
providing dominant capabilities to the warfighter to try to maintain the technological 
overmatch that [the United States has] always enjoyed and, if anything, to try to extend it 
if at all possible” (2015, para. 16). 
9. DOD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02  
The 2015 reissuance of DOD Instruction 5000.02, initially presented in an interim 
version in November 2013 and released in its current version in January 2015, is one of 
the most recent acquisition reform efforts. There are four (4) overarching objectives: 
• “Decrease emphasis on ‘rules’ and increase emphasis on process intent 
and thoughtful program planning 
• Provide program structures and procedures tailored to the dominant 
characteristics of the product being acquired and to unique program 
circumstances 
• Enhance the discussion of program management responsibility and key 
supporting disciplines 
• Institutionalize changes to statute and policy since the last issuance of 
DoDI 5000.02.” (National Defense Industrial Association [NDIA], 2015, 
p. 2) 
The 2015 DoDI 5000.02 focuses on critical thinking, program tailoring, and 
codifying the reform efforts contained in the BBP guidance documents. Changes include, 
but are not limited to: 
• “Core document tone to more clearly communicate management intent, 
from compliance to thoughtful planning 
• Notes added to tables to clarify requirements 




• Substantial revisions to all enclosures, to 
• Accommodate [acquisition] community concerns 
• Clarify/streamline procedures.” (NDIA, 2015, p. 3) 
 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE 
ACQUISITION SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORTS 
1. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2013 Annual Report 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD (AT&L)) published the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 
2013 Annual Report in June 2013. The purpose of this report is to “provide improved 
insights into key aspects of total life-cycle cost performance to inform policy decisions 
about the overall acquisition system and institution” (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [OUSD AT&L], 2013, p. 2). The 2013 
Annual Report focuses on the development and early production life-cycle phases, as 
data is most readily available for these phases. 
2. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report 
Published in June 2014, the second annual report both updates the prior year’s 
analysis and newly focuses on contract incentives for development and early production 
contracts. The report “examines various incentive techniques to see how effective they 
are at driving cost, schedule, and technical performance” (2014, p. iii). 
3. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2015 Annual Report 
USD (AT&L) published the third annual report in September 2015. This 2015 
Annual Report continues to build upon prior year analyses. This continuity provides 
additional confidence that changes seen in the prior year reports are real. OUSD AT&L 
notes that “new analyses have been added to begin examining further inputs, factors that 
affect outcomes, and trends in inferred measures of complexity and risk” (2015, p. xiv). 
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4. Data Interpretation of the Annual Reports 
Each of the three annual reports presents the results of data-driven analysis; 
however, “interpretation of performance and the implication for policies are left largely 
to the reader” (2013, p. 2). Many analyses in each report are in the initial stages and 
indicate areas for future work. However, others are beginning to provide a consistent data 
set and provide increasing confidence in the trends shown therein.   
The analyses presented in the report consist of two main types of performance 
data:  program-level data, and contract-level data.   
5. Scope of the Annual Reports as it Relates to JPEO-CBD 
Each annual report uses data from several Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), which are defined as programs that meet or exceed the Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) I requirements as defined in DoDI 5000.02. Although the JPEO-CBD does not 
have any ACAT I programs, the trends can be reasonably applied to programs and 
projects within the JPEO-CBD’s portfolio. 
Therefore, the intent of this thesis is to analyze and interpret these results as they 
pertain to the JPEO-CBD. This information will be presented in Chapter III. 
Following the presentation of the report findings, I will correlate these results to 
the changes in DoDI 5000.02. Are the changes to DoDI 5000.02, as presented in the 
January 2015 version, based on sound analyses? 
C. CBDP ENTERPRISE STRUCTURE 
 Established in 1994, the CBDP was founded to prioritize CBD efforts within the 
DOD and to improve coordination of CBD doctrine, requirements, research, 
development, and acquisition among DOD and the military services (Gebicke, 1996, p. 
3). Figure 3 shows the current Enterprise structure of the CBDP, through the General 
Officer/Senior Executive Service Level. These organizations work together, under the 
guidance of the Army as the Executive Agent, to ensure that warfighters are properly 
prepared to respond to medical and non-medical CBD hazards. 
 12 
 
Figure 3.  CBDP Enterprise Organization 
D. JPEO-CBD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Prior to BBP 1.0, the JPEO-CBD was organized into eight (8) Joint Project 
Manager (JPM) offices. Various offices within JPEO-CBD supported the JPMs. Prior to 
BBP 2.0, the JPEO-CBD reorganized into seven (7) JPM offices and supporting 
headquarter functions, as shown in Figure 4. This organizational structure remained in 
place until March 2016.   
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Figure 4.  JPEO-CBD Organizational Structure through February 2016. 
Figure 5 depicts the most recent changes to the JPEO-CBD organizational 
structure. This reorganization occurred in March 2016, and decreased the number of JPM 
offices from seven (7) to five (5). JPM Guardian, JPM Radiological & Nuclear Defense, 
and JPM Elimination were consolidated into one JPM, called JPM Guardian. The other 
four (4) JPMs remain intact. The reasons for these reorganizations are not relevant to this 
project, and are provided to increase reader understanding of the Chemical Biological 














































Figure 5.  JPEO-CBD Organizational Structure after March 2016 
These JPM offices can be categorized into medical acquisition and non-medical 
materiel acquisition. This distinction is important, as each has unique requirements. 
Medical acquisition programs, managed and funded under Medical Countermeasure 
Systems, have additional requirements through other federal entities such as the Food and 































III. ACQUISITION REFORM DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. PRE-BBP 1.0 
1. Contract Total Cost Growth Trends: Development Phase Data 
The 2013 Annual Report analyzed total cost growth from 1992–2011. Total cost 
growth is a function of both work scope increase and cost-over-target growth. The 
contract total cost growth in then-year dollars is shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.  DOD Total Cost Growth: Development Contracts (1992–2011). 
Source: OUSD AT&L (2013, p. 43). 
Although this data is through 2011, it is included in the Pre-BBP 1.0 section for 
two (2) reasons: 1) the vast majority of the data represents the time before BBP 1.0 was 
issued, and 2) the changes influenced by BBP 1.0 would not have had noticeable effect 
on any trends only one (1) year after issue. Note that the trend line is a simple linear 
regression through all cost growth points. The 2014 and 2015 annual reports each 
provided one additional data point regarding the total cost growth for development 
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contracts. The trend line remains statistically significant, according to the 2015 Annual 
Report, and continues to trend downwards. 
2. Contract Cost Growth Trends: Development Phase Analysis 
The graph shown in Figure 6 shows a slight downward trend in contract total cost 
growth for development phase contracts. The reduction was 18 percentage points over 19 
years. It is important to note that many of the more recent contracts have not yet been 
completed, and are at risk of ending with higher cost growth than currently anticipated, 
thus potentially altering the trend line. 
The data shows that total contract cost growth has been trending favorably for 
over twenty (20) years. The authors of the 2013 Annual Report also note that no single 
contract type yields better cost control (2013, p. 109). As with the 2013 data, there are 
significant differences in cost-growth among development contracts within both the 2014 
and 2015 data sets. OUSD AT&L notes that “the outlier cases must be prevented going 
forward” (2014, p. 49). 
B. BETWEEN BBP 1.0 AND BBP 2.0 
1. Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) Data 
The Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) is 
responsible for conducting root cause analyses for all “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
and those requested by the Secretary of Defense. Per the final report, Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System: 2013 Annual Report, PARCA conducted 18 such analyses, 
from 2010 to 2012, that are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   PARCA Root Causes Analyses (Statutory and Discretionary; 2010–2012) 
Source: OUSD AT&L (2013, p. 34). 
  Dominant Cause 
10 of 18 Poor management performance 
• Poor requirements traceability 
• Ineffective use of contractual incentives 
• Poor Risk Management 
• Poor Situational Awareness within the chain of command 
5 of 18  Baseline cost and schedule estimates 
• Invalid framing assumptions 
4 of 18  Change in Procurement Quantity 
   
  Infrequent 
1 of 18  Immature technology, excessive manufacturing or integration risk 
2 of 18  Unrealistic performance expectations 
1 of 18 Unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology 
issues 
None  Funding inadequacy or instability 
 
In just over half of the cases analyzed, the root cause can be categorized as poor 
management performance or effectiveness (2013).   
The Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2015 Annual Report 




Figure 7.  Program Cost-Related Performance: Nunn-McCurdy Breaches (2007–
2014). Source:  OUSD AT&L. (2015, p. xxii). 
2. PARCA Analysis 
The 2013 PARCA data shows a disturbing trend:  “poor management 
performance or poor management effectiveness is the root cause of just over half of all 
breaches analyzed. Problem areas include poor systems engineering to translate user 
requirements into testable specifications, ineffective use of contractual incentives, poor 
risk management, poor situational awareness across the life-cycle, unrealistic cost and 
schedule estimates, and quantity changes” (2013, p. 34).   
However, the 2015 Report provides a more positive outlook. Although non-
quantity changes are the primary root cause of all Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and those 
causes remain generally the same as the 2013 report, the frequency of those breaches is 
decreasing as shown in Figure 7. The report notes that there is anecdotal evidence that 
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programs are showing improved execution, which may be tied to initiatives such as BBP 
that continue to raise cost consciousness.   
C. POST-2015 DODI 5000.02 
1. JPEO-CBD Program Schedules 
a. Medical Acquisition Portfolio Programs 
The JPEO-CBD medical acquisition portfolio contains a number of programs. 
One such program is a therapeutics program called Bioscavenger-Plasma (BSCAV-P). 
BSCAV-P is a plasma-derived prophylactic regimen designed to protect the warfighter 
from incapacitation and death caused by traditional and non-traditional nerve agents.   
Data is available for BSCAV-P beginning in FY 2011. In December 2010, the 
BSCAV program office presented an In-Process Review (IRP) decision briefing to the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), which presents MS B as occurring in 1QFY12 and 
MS C occurring in 3QFY17. The MS B decision and resulting APB occurred in 4QFY12, 
more specifically September 2012. The program Life Cycle Management Plan (LCMP), 
signed by the MDA in December 2011, presents MS B occurring in 3QFY12 and MS C 
in 1QFY18. According to an updated APB from November 2013, the objective date for 
MS C Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is 1QFY19. These dates are presented in  
Table 2. 
Table 2.   BSCAV-P Schedule 
Event Schedule as of 
2011 
Schedule as of 
2012 
Schedule as of 
2013 
Delta 
Milestone B 1QFY12 3QFY12 4QFY12 + 3 Quarters 
Milestone C 3QFY17 1QFY18 1QFY19 + 4 Quarters  
 
Another medical acquisition program is the Next Generation Diagnostic System 
(NGDS). The NGDS is a portable biological pathogen diagnostic and identification 
system that will replace the currently fielded Joint Biological Agent Identification and 
Diagnostic System. Increment 1 is a direct replacement; Increment 2 will address 
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objective threats using multiple capability sets. There are multiple increments, which are 
combined for simplicity. 
The NGDS Increment 1 LCMP, signed in June 2012 at MS A, indicates multiple 
IPRs on the path to MS C, scheduled to occur in 2QFY15. As of the March 2016 IPR 
brief, MS C for Increment 1 is scheduled for 1QFY17. This brief also indicates that MS B 
for Increment 2 was scheduled for 3QFY16. According to updated information received 
from JPEO-CBD, the current schedule for MS B for Increment 2 is 3QFY17. These dates 
are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3.   NGDS Schedule 
Event Schedule as of 
2012 






 Increment 2 




2QFY15 4QFY16 1QFY17 + 7 Quarters 
 
b. Non-Medical Acquisition Portfolio Programs 
The Next Generation Chemical Detector (NGCD) program is contained within the 
JPEO-CBD non-medical acquisition portfolio. The program began in FY 2011 to 
improve the warfighter’s ability to detect and identify non-traditional agents, chemical 
warfare agents, and toxic industrial chemicals in air and on surfaces. The NGCD 
schedule is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Next Generation Chemical Detector Schedule 
Event Schedule as of 
2011 
Schedule as of 
2015 
Delta 
Milestone A 3QFY13 3QFY13 No change 
Preliminary Design 
Review 
4QFY16 4QFY16 No change 
Milestone B 1QFY17 3QFY17 + 2 Quarters 
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The Joint Biological Tactical Detection System (JBTDS) program, designed to 
provide a tactical biological warfare agent detection, collection, identification, and 
networking capability to the Joint warfighter, also began in FY11. The MS B Decision 
Review, presented to the MDA in October 2014, indicates that MS B occurred at that 
time with MS C scheduled in 4QFY17. The program office presented an IPR decision 
brief in March 2016 indicating that MS C is delayed until 4QFY18. The JBTDS schedule 
is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Joint Biological Tactical Detection System Schedule 
Event Schedule as of 
2014 
Schedule as of 
2015 
Delta 
Milestone B 1QFY15 1QFY15 No change 
Milestone C 4QFY17 4QFY18 + 4 Quarters 
 
All program data was compiled from multiple sources within JPEO-CBD, as the 
data was not available from a single database or repository.   
2. Program Schedule Analysis 
The schedules shown in Tables 2 through 5 are a small representative sample of 
both the medical and non-medical portfolios within JPEO-CBD. All four programs 
experienced at least six (6) months, or two (2) quarters, of schedule growth between 2011 
and 2016. 
The cause of these schedule changes remains unclear, however. Although no 
program appears to have gained efficiency, which would be reflected in a negative 
schedule change, it is not obvious what caused these schedule slips. One possibility for 
the schedule growth may be additional requirements provided in the 2015 DoDI 5000.02. 
Other possible causes for these schedule changes could be additional user requirements, 
more stringent or new testing requirements, or less funding in the intervening years to 
complete the same work. 
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Additionally, a number of programs within both the medical and non-medical 
acquisition portfolios have not had any schedule changes in recent years. However, there 
were no programs within JPEO-CBD that experienced positive schedule impacts. In other 
words, no program schedules showed milestones occurring earlier than originally 
planned. This indicates that recent acquisition reforms have not caused program 
schedules within the JPEO-CBD portfolios to increase in efficiency and provide 
capability to the warfighter sooner than planned. 
3. Documentation Requirements Data 
Table 6 compares documentation requirements for selected documents necessary, 
either by statue or regulation, for ACAT III programs as stated in the 2008 and 2015 
versions of DoDI 5000.02. Data focuses on ACAT III programs, as these are the most 
common ACAT level in JPEO-CBD. 
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Table 6.   Selected Document Comparison, DoDI 5000.02 (2008) vs. DoDI 5000.02 (2015) 
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Table 6 presents thirty-four (34) selected documents and eight (8) potential 
decision points that may require those documents. In each DoDI 5000.02 version, 2008 
versus 2015, there are 272 occurrences where documents could be required. Of the 
potential occurrences, seventy (70) documents or document updates were required for 
ACAT III programs in the 2008 version of DoDI 5000.02; one-hundred-twenty-two (122) 
documents or document updates were required in the 2015 version 
4. Documentation Requirements Analysis 
Over all of the eight decision points, documentation requirements increased by 
almost 20% between the 2008 and 2015 versions of DoDI 5000.02. Some documents, 
such as the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) and Capability Development 
Document (CDD) updates are required more often now than in the past. There are also 
some new documents required, such as the Cyber Security Strategy and Should-Cost 
Targets. 
The expected effect of the increased documentation requirements is not an overall 
increase in acquisition effectiveness or efficiency. More program staff will be required to 
complete the documents, which will drive up the cost of a program. Alternatively, no 
additional staff will be hired and the work will be completed by current team members. 
Because the new documents are additional duties, the program schedule may slip as staff 
will have to prioritize this additional work. In the worst case, important management or 
oversight may be neglected due to shifting priorities. 
5. CBD Contractual Workload Data 
Throughout the CBDP enterprise, there are a number of contracting commands 
that provide services. The Army Contracting Command-Aberdeen Proving Ground 
(ACC-APG) is the parent contracting organization for ten (10) contracting centers that 
provides a number of contracting-related services to the Army. Of these ten (10) 
contracting centers that service the Army, five (5) provide full-spectrum contracting 
services to JPEO-CBD. Figure 8 shows the ACC-APG and subordinate command 
organizational structure that the JPEO-CBD uses. Additional centers not shown in  
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Figure 8 include ACC-Adelphi, ACC-Denver, ACC-Ft. Detrick, ACC-Orlando, and 
ACC-Tobyhanna. 
 
Figure 8.  ACC-APG Organizational Structure Supporting JPEO-CBD 
ACC-APG provided comprehensive data for FY12-FY15 for this project. As the 
organizational structure, and therefore record keeping, changed in FY12, comprehensive 
data is not available for FY11 and prior. Table 7 provides a summary of the total number 
of actions performed by ACC-APG; the total number of those actions that can be 
attributed to JPEO-CBD; the total funds obligated by APG-ACC; the funds obligated that 
can be attributed to JPEO-CBD; and the percentage of work, measured in both number of 
actions and funds obligated, that are attributed to JPEO-CBD. 




















FY12 37,153 1,083 2.91% $15,106,694,543 $740,867,335 4.90% 
FY13 31,248 1,221 3.91% $12,680,685,618 $590,214,092 4.65% 
FY14 30,356 1,494 4.92% $10,897,392,830 $430,112,125 3.95% 


















ACC-Natick ACC-Research Triangle Park 
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Another way to consider this same data is represented in Figures 9 and 10.  
Figure 9 shows the total number of ACC-APG contract actions on the primary Y-axis and 
the contract actions attributed to JPEO-CBD on the secondary Y-axis. 
 
Figure 9.  ACC-APG and JPEO-CBD Contract Actions, FY12-FY15 
Figure 10 shows the total ACC-APG funding obligations, in $M, on the primary 
Y-axis and the funding obligations attributed to JPEO-CBD on the secondary Y-axis, also 
in $M. 
 
































































































Another way to consider this same data is by the individual contracting divisions. 
Although there are nine (9) divisions that service JPEO-CBD, this report will consider 
only the four (4) most active in the JPEO-CBD portfolio. These divisions are: ACC-
Belvoir, ACC-Edgewood, ACC-Natick, and ACC-APG Tenant  The remaining five (5) 
divisions have processed fewer than five (5) actions in each FY for the JPEO-CBD. 
a. ACC-Belvoir 
ACC-Belvoir, located at Fort Belvoir, VA processed twenty-five (25) contracting 
actions for JPEO-CBD between FY12 and FY15. The overall JPEO-CBD funding 
obligations total -$565,415, meaning that the contracting office largely deobligated 
funding from contracts. One of the reasons this occurs is that the contract has reached the 
end of its period of performance, and the contractor did not spend all of the funds 
available. This happens for a variety of reasons, including cost under-runs or lessening 
the scope of the contract. ACC-Belvoir performed zero (0) contract actions for JPEO-
CBD in FY14. This data is presented in Figure 11. 
 










































ACC-Edgewood, located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD processed 1,020 
contracting actions for JPEO-CBD between FY12 and FY15. The overall JPEO-CBD 
funding obligations total $958.8M. This data is presented in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  ACC-Edgewood Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for JPEO-
CBD, FY12-FY15 
c. ACC-Natick 
ACC-Natick, located in Natick, MA, processed 4,300 contracting actions for 
JPEO-CBD between FY12 and FY15. The overall JPEO-CBD funding obligations total 






































Figure 13.  ACC-Natick Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for JPEO-
CBD, FY12-FY15 
d. ACC-APG Tenant 
ACC-APG Tenant, also located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, processed 
sixty-five (65) contracting actions for JPEO-CBD between FY12 and FY15. The overall 









































Figure 14.  ACC-APG Tenant Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for 
JPEO-CBD, FY12-FY15 
e. ACC-Combined 
For a more comprehensive look at the four (4) divisions that service JPEO-CBD 
most often, data for these divisions, hereafter referred to as APG-Combined, is combined 








































Figure 15.  ACC-Combined Contract Actions and Funding Obligations for JPEO-
CBD, FY12-FY15 
6. JPEO-CBD Contractual Workload Analysis 
Figures 9 through 15 show a variety of data and trends. First, compare the total 
number of contract actions of ACC-APG versus the number of contract actions 
completed for JPEO-CBD (Figure 9). The number of contract actions performed by 
ACC-APG appears to have steadied over FY13-FY15, while the number of JPEO-CBD 
contract actions has continued to increase. 
Without insight into the full scope of programs ACC-APG supports, it is difficult 
to determine why the number of contract actions at ACC-APG has leveled off. One 
possibility is that there is less work being performed by contractors as funding resources 
have become scarcer, meaning that fewer contract actions are required to initiate or 
continue work. Another possibility is that various program offices have become more 
efficient in their contracting approach, and thus require fewer actions to complete the 
planned effort. 
The growth in number of JPEO-CBD contract actions shown in Figure 9 is 
clearer. In the first quarter of FY13, JPEO-CBD issued its first omnibus contract. The 
JPEO-CBD designed its Omnibus Program, Engineering and Technical Support services 










































across the portfolio and increasing competition and flexibility. Task orders are awarded 
as Firm Fixed Price awards, which reduces the risk to the government.   
Through ACC-Natick, JPEO-CBD issued seventy (70) contract awards through 
OPETS. Figure 13 shows the 30% growth in number of contract awards between FY12 
and FY13 at ACC-Natick, due largely to the initial OPETS award. However, the total 
amount of funding awarded by ACC-Natick in the same time period has fallen. It is 
difficult to draw conclusions on the cause of the decline in obligations, and whether or 
not it is a consequence of the BBP initiatives and acquisition reform efforts. This decline 
in obligations may also be due to declining JPEO-CBD total obligation authority (TOA) 
in those years. 
Figure 10, showing ACC-APG and JPEO-CBD funding obligations, provides a 
similar comparison. Between FY12 and FY15, total funding obligated by ACC-APG 
shows a clear downward trend beginning the year that BBP 2.0 was released, although it 
is difficult to attribute this trend to the measures that BBP 2.0 focused on. As with the 
ACC-Natick data, possible explanation could be that obligations decreased due to 
declining TOA. Further analysis is needed to determine if there is a correlation between 
the reforms implemented with BBP 2.0 and the downward obligation trend at ACC-APG. 
There is also no apparent reason for the increase in JPEO-CBD obligations in FY15, as 
the FY15 TOA did not increase over prior years. 
Taken individually, Figures 11–14 do not show any clear trends. Combined in 
Figure 15, however, the data becomes clearer. Between FY12 and FY15, the number of 
contract actions attributed to JPEO-CBD increased, while the overall funding obligations 
decreased over the same time period. 
One of the likely causes of this trend is the BBP 1.0 requirement to develop the 
cost estimate showing what the program “should-cost.”  Should-cost estimates target 
controlling program cost growth. Within the CBD enterprise, the new should-cost 
requirement presented the JPEO and JPMs with additional challenges; both the JPMs and 
the contractors now need to develop two (2) cost estimates. This manifests in the data 
above as ACC-Combined contracting officers had to issue additional contract 
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modifications regarding the requirement without an increase in funding obligations. This 
demonstrates that, at least in the short term, BBP 1.0 did not improve efficiency in the 
acquisition process through the use of should-cost management. Instead, workload to 
execute the program increased.  
Although these comparisons indicate that BBP 1.0 rather than the 2015 DoDI 
5000.02 caused a downturn in program efficiency, it is essential to note that one of the 
primary objectives of the DoDI 5000.02 is to codify policy and guidance changes made 
after the 2008 DoDI 5000.02. This indicates that, at a minimum, the 2015 DoDI 5000.02 




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As fiscal constraints continue to impinge upon the DOD’s ability to field 
capability to the warfighter, changing the way the DOD does business becomes 
increasingly important. The 2015 DoDI 5000.02 is the most recent acquisition reform 
effort to increase acquisition process effectiveness and efficiency. 
Data from the 2013 Annual Report, provided in Chapter III.A.1, shows that DOD 
contracts have been trending toward decreasing cost for over twenty (20) years—well 
before 2015. This demonstrates that the 2015 DoDI 5000.02 is likely to have limited 
effect on driving contract costs down throughout the DOD, as they began declining long 
before the release of the updated DoDI 5000.02.   
Although more work and understanding are needed to continue to reduce the 
number of critical and significant Nunn-McCurdy breaches described in Chapter III.B.1, 
the Department of Defense has implemented stronger guidance and policies through the 
release of DoDI 5000.02. Specifically, the DOD 2015 report states that “the DOD has 
made significant progress in improving our systems engineering practices.”  There is not 
yet enough data available to support the assertion that significant progress has been made, 
although it may in time, if metrics can be established to verify that effects can be 
demonstrated. 
Within the JPEO-CBD, it is difficult to determine the likely effect on contract 
cost. Data presented in Chapter III.C.1 provides limited insight into how DoDI 5000.02 
may have influenced the representative program schedules. While the increased 
schedules may have been due to the 2015 document, there are also other factors in play.   
A more clear indication that DoDI 5000.02 may not have the desired effect of 
greater efficiency is described in Chapter III.C.3. There has been a 20% increase in the 
number of documents or document updates required at various milestones and decision 
points. This is not likely to increase efficiency within the acquisition process. More 
documents require more time and/or more resources to prepare and staff the documents. 
The author does concede that some of the changes will likely increase the effectiveness of 
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a program and facilitate positive outcomes, such as adding OMS/MP documentation 
requirement. Overall, however, additional documentation requirements will likely cause 
negative schedule impacts. 
The data presented in Chapter III.C.5 demonstrate that CBD enterprise contract 
costs have been decreasing over prior years. Between FY12 and FY15, the number of 
contract actions attributed to JPEO-CBD increased, while the overall funding obligations 
decreased over the same time period. In other words, increased contract workload 
obligated fewer funds. Further study will be needed in future years to determine what 
impact DoDI 5000.02 will have on these trends.   
Within the JPEO-CBD community, this latest effort in acquisition reform is likely 
to produce few positive changes for program efficiency or effectiveness. While the 
instruction was developed to “increase emphasis on process intent and thoughtful 
program planning rather than on rules and compliance,” this is subjective (NDIA, 2015, 
p. 2). The JPEO-CBD has begun placing more emphasis on tailoring each program, yet 
program tailoring had also been discussed in previous versions. Additionally, tailoring 
often involves requesting waivers for certain requirements, which may not serve to drive 
efficiency into the program as waiver processes can be equally time-consuming. 
Moreover, one needs to determine what metrics may be suitable for measuring process 
intent and thoughtful program planning to determine whether the 2015 DoDI 5000.02 has 
been successful.   
Additionally, as the data and analysis indicate, there has been an increase in the 
work required to bring programs through development and into fielding. While poor 
management performance remains the leading cause of Nunn-McCurdy program 
breaches, program and contracting offices are required to use additional resources to 
accomplish less work as the DOD struggles to do more without more.   
Developing new acquisition reform efforts every year has not delivered 
capabilities to the warfighter faster. In many cases, these efforts may have had the 
opposite effect. The DOD would benefit from allowing additional time between issuing 
new guidance to allow for increased analysis regarding whether the previous reform 
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efforts were successful in their intent. Additional study time would allow the DOD to 
develop more effective reform initiatives. This can be difficult to accomplish, however, 
given that acquisition occurs in a constantly changing environment. 
One limitation of this project is that trends can be difficult to analyze, as most of 
them are based on lagging indicators such as historical cost and schedule trends. The 
DOD needs to determine realistic and feasible leading indicators that can predict outcome 
and instill proactive effort rather than the reaction to emerging problems that is necessary 
when using lagging indicators. 
Another limitation is the lack of discussion on tailoring various aspects of a 
program from inception through development to fielding. This project focused solely on 
contracts and funding. Other areas of study that might provide additional insight are areas 
such as test and evaluation, logistics, and systems engineering. For example, one of the 
known complications of JPEO-CBD program schedules and funding are the test 
requirements imposed by the Army test community. JPEO-CBD programs are largely 
ACAT III, yet are tested to the level and with the thoroughness of ACAT I programs. 
These requirements drive both the schedule and the resources required, and should be 
studied in further detail to provide greater insight into how the DoDI 5000.02’s emphasis 
on tailoring might help deliver capabilities to the warfighter more rapidly. 
Finally, measuring the effectiveness of acquisition reform is difficult due to a 
number of factors. Each organization or program office conducts acquisition differently; 
targeting one variable for change and measuring the success of that change across 
different military services and organizations is impossible. This is especially true when 
data is not collected nor maintained in a standard manner. 
Therefore, one recommendation is to consider creating a standard method for data 
collection from all programs, regardless of size. Although the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database is intended to be a repository for 
acquisition program information, it is used only for MDAPs and Major Automated 
Information Systems (MAIS) programs. Expanding the DAMIR database to include more 
programs would provide a more robust look at the data and trends of all acquisition 
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efforts rather than the large-scale efforts of MDAPs and MAIS programs. This additional 
data collection burden placed on small program offices requires a cost-benefit analysis 
prior to policy change implementation.  
Additionally, while the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System reports 
were valuable in discussing performance trends, specifically in contract performance, it is 
difficult to understand whether these analyses compare directly to smaller programs. As 
with the DAMIR database, these reports focus only on MDAP and MAIS programs. One 
recommendation is to consider expanding the scope of these reports in future iterations to 
include the smaller acquisition programs. Although adding significant burden to 
workload of level II and III programs, this would allow the DOD acquisition community 
to better understand the implications and outcomes of reform measures more completely. 
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